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[1]

was "for and in consideration of the
division and settlement of all
and nature, whether

§ 63; Am.Jur., Husband

§249.
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MESSENGER V. MESSENGER

[3a, 3b] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.
-Where provisions for support and maintenance
an integral and inseverable part of a
agreement, her express promise not to seek
than as provided in such agreement cannot be
out changing the agreement; and since such
the consideration for the husband's
payments, he likewise cannot
thereof without changing the property settlemrnt
[4] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as
to the meaning of a property settlement agreement,
eourt's interpretation is not binding on the
[5] !d.-Property Settlement Agreements- In1cerprE:ta1ciOJ1.--Ii
the purpose of determining the meaning of a ""'""'w'"
ment agreement, the value of accounts receivable
the husband that is material is the value estimated
parties in their agreement, not the value estimated
court three years later.
[6] !d.-Property Settlement Agreements-Consideration.--Sinee
at the time a property settlement agreement is
the
parties may be uncertain as to which of their property is
community rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not
know how the court in a divorce action will find the facts or
how it would, in the absence of an acceptable
cise its diseretion in dividing the property and
alimony, the amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions
with respect to property and support and maintenance
of the parties may alone Rupply sufficient consideration to
support their entire agreement.
[7] Divorce -Permanent Alimony - Modification of Allowance:
Disposition of Community Property.-Where
secured
her divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, had the parties
not settled their rights by agreement the court in its discretion could have awarded plaintiff all of the
property and less alimony than she received under the agreement, in which case the alimony would be subjc>ct to reduction
in the event of changed circumstances.
[8] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.A wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of vvJ.llllm<u
property in exchange for support and maintenance
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community
property is substantially divided equally has no
on the
validity of the provision of the agreement whereby both
waive all rights to support and maintcnanee othc>r thnn as provided therein.
[9] !d.-Enforcement of Awards-Execution: Contempt.--Where
there was evidence that defendant had bern twice married
a'"CLCWCU
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lll"''"'"':u ll'ratltl(ie on which an exeeu""'","-"'.. "" could be

and
loss
time
finding that
is not in
of Court,"
cv1.nu"""'""·'.Y S11lS1J•endrrtg the issuance of a writ of exeeunel3eSI>it~ttirtg

!d.-Enforcement of Awards-Exeeutio:il.-Under Civ.
amended in 1951, the trial court has discretion to defor entermnle whether execution is an appropriate
its order for support payments to a wife granted a
for the husband's offense, and it was not an abuse of
diseretmn to condition the issuance of execution on the husnOJ:lCompliaJace with an order to discharge arrearages
installments where the court found on sufficient evidence
the issuance and enforcement of a writ of
""~"m'''vu would discredit the husband professionally and imto make the monthly payments and discharge

from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
purporting to amend a property settlement
uv•u~ub defendant not in contempt of court, and
issuance of execution. Clark Clement, Judge.
amending provisions of property settlement
interlocutory judgment based thereon,
judgment and order appealed

UUtSJ.U'0UV

Herbert M. Braden and Lawrence W.
for Respondent.
J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in
in 1950. On January 3, 1951, they exeyw,nn•>rr·.r settlement agreement. Thereafter plaintiff
for divorce, and on January 8, 1951, an
"""r"'f'':r decree was granted to her on the ground of
The decree approved and incorporated by
the provisions of the agreement and expressly
defendant to pay $500 per month ''as agreed in said
uLHa.utou" agreement.'' The final decree was entered
16, 1952.
pcua'""'

defendant was not in
the overdue
The court
execution should not be issued
the
the
that he "has no
or
successfully
manner in which such execution could
be served would be by placing a constable in charge of the
of the defendant; and, as the defendant is a
professional man, this Court finds that such an action ·would
result in considerable discredit to the defendant; and the
court further believes
if such action were taken, that the
a physician and surgeonl
of the defendant
would be reduced to such a degree that it would materially
affect the ability of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
reduced
as set by this Court.'' The court ordered that
the
settlement agreement be amended to provide
for the payment of $375 per month, and income tax on an
income of $4,500 per year instead of $500 per month and income tax on an income of $6,000 per year. It found that the
amount due plaintiff from defendant to March 10, 1954, was
$5,668 and ordered defendant to pay $800 on or before that
date and $50 per month in addition to the reduced alimony
payments to be applied on the balance due. The issuance of
execution was suspended so long as defendant made these payments, but in the event of default, an execution was to issue
forthwith.
Plaintiff
She contends that the provisions for
monthly payments and income tax payments were an integral
and inseparable part of the property settlement agreement
of the parties and are therefore not subject to modification.
Tn their
the parties provided:
""WHEREAS, thA parties hereto are husband and wife, and
that said parties hereto have agreed to divide an property
and property rights between them; and
"\VnEREAs, said parties do not make any arrangement or
arrangements as to any divorce proceedings by eit!1er of the

or
covenant and

tax.
mrnt.

to wit ''
provided for a division of the
proceeding the trial court found
received
worth
and that dereceived property worth
3
"That the husband agrees to pay to
for her care, maintenance and
the sum of
Fvn"'"'" ($300.00) Dor~JJARS per month,
monthly
commencing 011 ,T anuary 3rcl, 1951, receipt of
month's alimony is hereby aeknowledgcd, sueh
to pay to eontinu0 until the ;,vife dies or remarries."
15 provided ''That the husband agrees that
hereof he will pay to the wife a sufficient amount
above the FIVE HuxDRED
) DoLLARS per
, lJCrein agreed to be paid, to pay the income
any, to be paid by the wife on said alimony pay-

"
also provided that "It is further nnderstood

and
that the \Yife
relinquishes, abandons, and
rclea,;c·s a1l of her right, title and interest in and to any and all

·which is hereinbefore agreed shall be set apart to
the property of the husband, and to any and all
n"''""'"'" of evrry nature ·which said husband now has or that
or own, and aU
to future
and support from or
the said husband, exherein otherwise
provkled, and hereby
to inherit any prop;dmtsoeyer
now owns or possesses
he may hereafter own or possess, or of ,,·hich he may
and an property which is hereinbefore
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set
to him shall be and remain forever
parties hereto the separate property of the husband.'' A
similar provision related to the husband,
that his
of all right to future support and maintenance was not
fied by the clause, ''except as herein otherwise
provided.''
Plaintiff's complaint referred to the $500 per
payments as alimony and prayed that the court approve
property settlement agreement, make it
of the
and order defendant to pay $500 per month "for the
maintenance and support of the plaintiff, as therein
The interlocutory decree approved the agreement, made it
part of the decree by reference, and expressly ordered defendant to pay $500 per month ''for the care,
and support of the plaintiff, as agreed in said property settlement agreement." The final decree provided that "It is
further ordered and decreed that wherein said
decree makes any provision for alimony'' said
''be
and the same is hereby made binding on the parties affected
thereby the same as if herein set forth in full, and that
wherein said interlocutory decree relates to the property of
the parties hereto, said property be and the same is hereby
assigned in accordance with the terms thereof to the parties
therein declared to be entitled thereto.
"IT Is FuRTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the
community property of the parties hereto is ordered divided,
in accordance with the property settlement agreement approved in the Interlocutory Decree entered herein and the
order for support payments as are provided for therein are
hereby ratified and confirmed."
Since the final decree merely confirms the provisions of
the interlocutory decree and the property settlement agreement, and since the interlocutory decree ordered that the payments be made ''as agreed in said property settlement agreement," we must examine the agreement to determine whether
the provisions for monthly payments and income tax payments are separable from the provisions that divide the
property, or whether they are an integral and inseparable
part of the division of property and therefore an inseparable
part of the consideration for the property settlement. If
they fall into the latter category they cannot now be modified.
(De.J:ter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 40-41 [265 P.2d
: Ailarns
v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621, 625 [177 P.2d 265].)
[1] In support of his contention that the
fall
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defendant stresses the fact that
for the wife's support are
1
, 1 3, 2 and 153 as alimony and
characteristics of alimony in that
wife dies or remarries. Similar conDexfel· v. De:cter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41
42 Cal.2d
r52-53
out that the labels adopted by
and agreed as to this policy [life insurance] that
reverses ot other reasons beyond the control of the
is nceessary to borrow money thereon for the purpose of
alimony hereinafter agreed to be paid by the husband, but
the husband may borrow on said policy for the
alimony, but for no other purpose. . . . " (Italics
lmslmnrl agrees to pay to the wife for her care, mainte·
the sum of FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per
monthly in advance, commencing on January 3rd, 1951,
whieh first month's alimony is hereby acknowledged, such
pay to continuo until the wife dies or remarries.'' (Italics
the husband agrees
sufficient amount over
month
to ho

that from date hereof he will pay to the
anrl above the FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00)
herein agreed to be paid, to pay the in·
tho wife on said alimony payment. . . . ''

intiff contends, however, that since the monthly payments were

on her death or remarriage and were described as alimony
of her complaint, they should be so treated. She points out
were intended as a division of property it would have been
for the agreement to provide that they should continue
amount had. been paid. These considerations would be more
the issue presented was whether, on the one hand, the
pnymcnts were solely part of a division of the community prop·
on the other hand, solely alimony. \Vhen, as in this case, how·
have made the provision for support and maintenance
of their property settlement agreement, the monthly
ordinarily haYo a dual character. To the extent that
to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance
reflect tbe eharacteristics of that obligation and thus
alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to the
tlwt they represent a division of the community property itself,
inseparable part of the consideration for the property
are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified
the terms of the property settlement agreement of the
eontends, however, that since the payments were labeled
wrre to cease on her remarriage, and were subject to modificaevcnt of a rednrtion of defendant's pension, there is evidence
the trinl comt'f1 implied finding that they were solely alimony
to moclificatio11.
. The labels adopted by the parties are
8inco tlw
must be considered as a whole. rcita·
ont in tlH' Dexter case, to the extent tllfe

v.
supra, at pp.
that the support
aud maintenance provided in paragraph 3, like the division
of
in paragraphs 1 and 2, was "for
and in consideration of the permanent and
division and
settlement of all their property rights of every kind and
nature, whether separate or community
"
[3a] :!\foreover, as in Fox v.
supra, at page
the
wife waived "all right to future maintenance and support
from or
the said husband, except as herein otherwise provided,"
in paragraph 3. Her express promise not to seek
alimony except as provided in the agreement could not ''be
abrogated without changing· the property settlement agreement of the parties." (Ibicl.) Similarly, since this waiver
'vas part of the consideration for the husband's agreement to
make the support payments, he likewise could not seek a
modification thereof without changing the
settlement agreement of the parties. It is clear,
that if
the parties meant the maintenance and support provisions to
be alimony separable from a division of the property they
would not have included this waiver
Helvern v.
139 Oal.App.2d 819, 829-830 [294 P.2d 482]), for an order
allowing alimony is subject to revision at any time. (Hough
v. Hough, 26 Oal.2d 605, 612 r160 P.2d 15] .)
[ 4] In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as to
the meaning of the
the trial court's interpretation of it is not binding on this court.
v.
42 Cal.
2d 49, 52 [265 P.2d 881 J ; Estate
Platt, 21 Oal.2d 343, 352
r131 P.2d 825] .) The evidence offered and introduced in
this case was coneerned primarily with defendant's ability to
monthly payments are designed to discharge the obligation of
and maintenance, they will ordinarily have some of the
alimony.''

comits conclusion that the
of the consideration for
were therefore
to
was based on a reevaluation of the
to defendant under the agreethe
the parties estimated the value of
at $15,000. The trial court estimated their value
It is obvious that for the purpose of determining
of the
the value that is material is the
in their agreement, not the
estimated
the court three years later.
Even if the evidence had showed that when the parties
their
understood that plaintiff would
worth $82,850 and defendant would receive
it would not support the conclusion
were subject to modification. 'l'he agree" permanent and lasting division" of all
in
as well as community property.
As stated in Dexte1· v.
at p. 43) "[A lt
a property settlement is made, the parties may be
to which of their property is community rather
and
will ordinarily not know ho>v the court
divorce action will find the facts or how it would, in
nhsencc of an
exercise its discretion
the
and a\varding alimon?. The amicable
doubtful questions with respect to the
and maintenance rights of the parties
sufficient consideration to Rnpport their
f Citation.] Thus in the present case, the
recited that
desired to settle their property and
maintenance rights 'by friendly agreement, into court for said purpose.' [7] Moreover,
u"'""""'

}1ESSENUER V.

secured her divorce
the
not settled
the court could in its discretion
all of the community property and less
In
received under her
alimony would be subject to reduction in the
circumstances. [8] Plaintiff was entitled to
an equal division of the community ~~A~A'''"'
support and maintenance payments that could
Accordingly, the fact that the
divided equally has no bearing on the
of the agreement whereby both parties waived all
support and maintenance other than as
therein.
[Citations.]" In the present case the very fact that the finding of the respective values was based on
evidence
indicates that the parties were in doubt as to the value of
their property and that they meant what they said when they
provided that both the division of their
and the
monthly payments were "for and in consideration of the
permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their
property rights of every kind and nature . . . . " Moreover,
in the absence of the agreement the court could have awarded
plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony,
and just as in the Dexter case, she was entitled to agree instead to a substantially equal division of the community property in exchange for support and maintenanee payments that
could not be reduced.
[2b, 3b] When as in this case the parties have clearly expressed their "purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal
and property rights," have provided that the provision for
alimony is "for and in consideration of the permanent and
lasting division and settlement of all their
rights
of every kind and nature," and the wife has waived "all
right to future maintenanee and support . . . , exeept as
herein otherwise expressly provided," the conclusion is inescapable that they have made the provisions for support and
maintenance an integral and inseparable part of their property settlement agreement. With such conclusive evidence of
integration, the provisions for support and maintenance or
alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties
expressly so provided. (See Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 CaL
2d 55, 61, and cases cited.) The court may
however,
"insert what has been omitted" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and
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of the
contends that the trial court erred in failing
of court and in conditionally
issuance of a writ of execution. There was
had been twice married after his
that he had no assets other than the
medical
upon which an execution
and that he had suffered a partial stroke
loss of time from his practice. On the basis
and evidence of defendant's income and
the trial court was justified in finding that de">d1ile in arrears, is not in contempt of Court," and
financial obligations of said defendant have been
nature so as to have prevented the payment of the
each and every month."
""Qnn.~+ to the question of execution, both parties rely
Y.
29 Ca1.2d 144 [173 P.2d 657], and
v Di Corpo. 33 Cal.2d 195 [200 P.2d 529], dealing
to execution on an installment judgment under
of section 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
stated in the I.~ohman case that "AJthough issuance of
upon a judgment requiring monthly payments may
upon equitable grounds, proof that the installments
nccrued 'lvithin fiye years 6 establishes a prima facie right
and the bnrdrn is cast upon the judgment debtor
faets justifying an order denying the writ''
at
and in the Di Corpo ease that "Thus, upon
that installments have accrued within
the burden was upon defendant to establish facts
an order rrealling the writ." (33 Cal.2d at 201.)
however, that it is unnecessary to dewhether i!rf<'ndant has met the burden referred to
section 139 of the Civil Code provided that
a divorre is granted for an offense of the husband,
may compel him to provide for the maintenance
children of the marriage, and to make such suitable
to the wife for hrr support, during her life or for
as the court may deem jnst, having regard to
of the parties respectively . . . . " An order
of Civil Proeednre section 681 was amended in 19.55 to provide
instead of a !i-year period.
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""Whenever an order for the payment of a sum of money is made
court
to the
of this
it may be enforced
the same manner as if it were
[10] In
section 139

discretion to determine in each case whether execution is an
for
its order. In the present
case the court found on sufficient evidence that to
the
issuance and enforcement of a writ of execution would discredit defendant professionally and
his
to make
the monthly payments and discharge the arrearages. Accordit did not abuse its discretion in
the
issuance of execution on defendant's
with
its order to discharge the arrearages in installments.
To the extent that the judgment modifies the
of the property settlement
and the
and final decree based thereon it is reversed. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its
own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C.

and McComb,

concurred.

CARTER, J.-I concur in tl1e conclusion reached in the
majority opinion. I do not, however, agree with the reasoning
leading thereto.
I said in my dissent in Dexter v. De.ccter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 46
[265 P.2d 873], that this court " . . . had an opportunity
to clarify the law so that stability might be given to property
settlement agreements and agreements for support and maintenance. Not only do the majority holdings in these three
cases
v. Fox, 42 Oal.2d 49 (265 P.2d
; Dexter v.
Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36 (265 P.2d 873); Flynn v. Flynn, 42
Cal.2d 55 (26!5 P.2d
1 not settle the
but
add
untold confusion." I said in my dissent in the
case
( 42 Cal.2d
62,
that the holding of the
there
was an effective trap designed to catch both wary and un-
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was ()Xecutcd-whether
of a
Ill-

and th ercfore

ease under consideration, we haYe the majority
the judgment of the trial court insofar as it modified
of tbc "property settlement agreement." 'l'he
eonrt had coneluded that the monthly payments prolvere al
and therefore subject to modification.
here eoncludes that the monthly payments
of the property settlement agreement
and there fore not subject to modification. The following
si ement from the majority opinion leads the way to endbetween these parties and others in the same
''In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence
the trial court's interof the
of it is not binding on this conrt. (Po:x; v. Pox,
'a1.2d 49, 52 [2G5 P.2d 881]; Estate
Platt, 21 Cal.2d
ll~n P.2d
.) " The error in permitting this
and relitigatecl 1vhm the parties obintended a
and complete determination of their
rights leads to this r(•sult: The trial court here
that the monthly payments were alimony; the Distri<·T Conrt of Appeal concluded that the payments were an
part of a property settlement agreement and this
l:Ol!rt is now also so holding.
By its holding, the case is
now set at large and there must be a retrial of the matter.
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On the new trial, other evidence may be
will have a bearing on what the parties intended
entered into the agreement. If new evidence
introduced
which shows that the parties thought
for alimony or support and maintenance
wife, the trial court may again decide that such payments
were alimony and subject to modification; the District
of .Appeal might affirm the holding of the trial
it is highly probable that this court
that such payments were an integrated part of
settlement agreement and again set the case at
new triaL This one issue has already been passed upon by
the courts of this state four times-once when the divorce
was granted; again by the trial court when the wife applied
for an order of execution; next by the District Court of
.Appeal, and next, but far from last, by this court. This
interminable and expensive litigation all stems from the holding of a majority of this court that the question of what
the parties intended when they entered into their agreement
is one of fact which may be relitigated at some future time.
I have been advised by trial judges from all over the state
that they find the rules set forth in the Fox, Dexter and
Flynn cases extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply
in the various situations presented to them in actions for
divorce. So long as this condition exists, this court will have
the added burden of endeavoring to correct the honest errors
made by trial courts in this type of case. This situation
could be very easily remedied if this court would formulate
definite understandable rules to guide la··wyers and the judges
of the numerous superior courts of this state.
This court has not seen fit to correct its previous errors
but, on the contrary, added to the general confusion with
its holding in the case under consideration. It is at once
apparent from a glance at the signatures on the opinions in
all of these cases that trial judges and attorneys are not
the only ones who are confused as to the holdings in the Fox,
Dexter and Flynn eases. Here, we have Mr. Justice Shenk,
who signed Mr. Justice Traynor's opinions in the Fox, Dexter
and Flynn cases, dissenting· from his opinion herein. In
passing, it should be mentioned that, in my opinion, Mr.
Justice Shenk in his dissent correctly applies the rules set
forth in the Fox and Flynn cases that the trial court could
take extrinsic evidence iu aid of its interpretation of the

tr
it
UI

m
m
n
WI

he
of
te

bE
aI

su
re
eo

a~

ll1

af

T
OJ
ec
a1

h<
p~

fe

.June

MESSENGER

v.

MESSENGER

G83

[46 C.2d 619; 297 P.2d 988]

and that its conclusion based thereon was
evidence and should not be disturbed on
Code, sections 158, 159 and 175, all authorize con1aw
tract,: between husband and wife. Under the
it
be a very simple matter for this court to
down
understandable and workable rules of law applicable to agreemente; for property settlement, alimony, and
and
in divorce and separate maintenanc-e cases. Such
would permit lawyers properly to a(1vise their
permit husbands and wives seeking divorce who arn
and intelligently endeavoring to make a division
of
property, and arrangements for support anfl maintenaner, to do so without fear tltat snch arrangements would
be
ehanged b,\' a trial, or· an appellate court. 'rherc
appears to me to he no sound reason why contracts between
such parties should not, in the absence of fraud or overbe given the same stability and dignity accorded to
contracts entered into between persons not so related.
The rule of lavY I should like to see in effect in California
in
type of case is very simple and easy of application.
\Yhere the parties have entered into an agreement for a
division of their property, or where one has agreed to give,
and the other to receive, periodic payments in lien of a
dh·ision of their property, or in conjunction with a division
of thrir property, or for support and maintenance, or alimony,
thr agreement so entered into if approvPd by the court as
fair,
and equitable and not the result of any fraud or
overreaching, should be the sum total of the parties' rights
and liabilities and should not be subject to modification
unlrss the parties have expressly provided for a later modification, or unle!'>s a subsequent modif~ring agreement is exethem.
t'ntr•l
fn a divorer: aetion, when the partif'R have ('ntered into an
agTer:mf'nt invohi ng tl1eir property rightr-;, i he ronrt should
into the facts surrounding the rxecution thereof to
ascertain whether there has been any fraud or overreaching.
The court should also inquire into the terms and provisions
of the agreement to determine whether it is fair, ;just and
equitable. When the court approves the contraet as fair, just
and equitable and determines that there has been no fraud
Dexter (:USe it should be rememl>ered t!tat the majority, wllil"
ho!t1iug that the trial eourt could determine the <·haraeter of the monthly
payments involved, affirmed the trial court's action in sustaining defendant's objection to the introduction of evidence on that issue.
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or
the matter should be forever concluded and
the parties bound
the terms of their agreement.
Stated simply, the foregoing proposed rules mean only
this: That the parties have entered into an agreement which
the court has approved as fair and equitable and not the
result of fraud or overreaching; that such agreement should
be accorded the same finality and dignity as contracts entered
:into between
If the above rules were in effect in
the problem of incorporation would also be a very simple one. In
my opinion there is no incorporation of an agreement in a
divorce decree unless that agreement has been copied therein
in haec vet·ba, or its substance is stated therein, or unless a
copy of the agreement is attached physically to the decree
of divorce and referred to as being a part thereof. When
there has been an effective incorporation of the agreement
in the judgment, the agreement is merged therein and the
effect is to make the remedy one upon the judgment rather
than by separate action on the agreement itself. Incorporation should have absolutely no effect so far as the parties'
agreement is concerned. The agreement is a contract and
its terms should govern. If the decree orders compliance
with the terms of the agreement which has been incorporated
in the judgment, the only result should be in the form of
remedy available to the party seeking to enforce the judgment. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158 [124 P.2d
5].)
It is at once apparent that if the above rules had been
applied in the instant case, we would not have the chaos
and confusion here present. Here it is evident that the
parties intended a final settlement of their property rights
at the time the agreement \Vas executed. The holding of the
majority here destroys the effectiveness of the agreement
solemnly entered into by the parties and leaves their property
and rights in a state of uncertainty and confusion.
I would therefore reverse the judgment and order.
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-! am unable to agree with that
portion of the opinion which holds that the alimony payments to the wife were integrated in the property settlement
agreement and were therefore not subject to modification as
provided in section 139 of the Civil Code.
A property settlement agreement should be construed as
any other agreement. Here the parties were dealing at arm's
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and as
uot fall
to the power of the court
be
accordance with tl1c provisions of section
them
Code. "Where in the agreement there is a clear intenwaive them or to intrgrate and settle them as part
of all marital and property rights, the right of
to so contract is recognized. Here, as properly
the court, there was no such intention. The parties
and with obvious design used the word "alimony"
in
agreement. That word ordinarily means an allowanee made to the wife by her husband for her support after
a dissolution of their marriage by divorce. It is used frcin our statutes as incorporated in our official codes.
For example, it is specifically employed in sections 137, 140
anc1142 of ihe Civil Codn. Jn our decisional law it has been
used repeatedly in its on1inary sense. It must be assumed
that it was used in its ordinary sense throughout this proIt was first used by the parties in their agreement,
which lH'OYides that the defenrlant shall pay to the plaintiff
per month as "alimon~·" for her "support and main, and provides that ihese payments shall continue
"until the wife dies or remarries." Then in her complaint
for di yorce the wife asked for an mYard of "alimony" in
this same sum. She prayed that the property settlement
be approved and made a part of the decree and
court order the defendant to pay her $500 per month
care, maintenance and support "as therein agreed."
The interlocutory decree approyed the property settlement
and incorporated it by reference in the judgment
and ordered that the defenc1ant pay to the plaintiff $500
month for her "carr, maintenance and ;mpport . . . as
in said property settlement agreement . . . until the
dies or remarries . . . . " The \Yord "support" as
in section 139 of the Civil Code of course means alimony.
final decree of divorce specifically states that "wherein

[4G U.2d
decree makes any provision for alimony
made binding on the
affectecl
herein set forth in full.'' 'fhose t1f~erres havP
lweome finaL
Jhe
am! by the court of the descriptive
term and phrases "alimony," "care, mainand snpport" and "until the plaintiff dies or re" should not be disregarded and should be determinain
<lf: the findings and conclusions of tJw trial
in the present proceeding.
But this court now says, as a matter of law, that the
did not mean what they said when they used the
word ''alimony'' in their agreement, and that the trial court
did not mean what it said in its divorce decrees, and that
the findings and conclusions in the present proceeding are
without support in the record. If the agreement was without
ambiguity, as both parties contend, the trial court had the
power in the first instance to declare from its language
alone the intention of the parties, and its determination should
not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. A construction of
the agreement on that theory alone is reasonable. However,
each party contends that the agreement is unambiguous in
his or her favor, and this is one test of ambiguity. The fact
that the parties themselves each ascribe different meanings
to the words used indicates the existence of an ambiguity.
(Chastain v. Belmont, 43 Cal.2d 45, 51 [271 P.2d 498] ;
California Emp. Stab. Corn. v. Walters, 62 Cal.App.2d 554,
559 [149 P.2d 17].)
Notwithstanding her contention that the agreement is unambiguous in her favor the plaintiff at the hearing of the
present proceeding requested the court to take extrinsic evidence to aseertain the intention of the contracting parties
as to the alimony payments. In so doing she was met by
the construction of the agreement in the prior divorce proceedings to the unmistakable effect that alimony was not
integrated in the agrrement. However in compliance with
her request the trial court took extrinsic evidence. This
it had the right to do in aid of the interpretation of the
agreement when ambiguity is present or questionable. (Tuttle
v. Tuttle, 38 Cal.2d 419, 421 [240 P.2d 587] ; Flynn v. Flynn,
42 Cal.2d 55, 60 [265 P.2d 865] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49,
52 [265 P.2d 881] .)
Having before it the terms of the agreement, the divorce
rlcPrees and the extrinsic evidence, the trial court found and
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alimony as such was not intended to
in the agreement and was not affected
therein waiving ''all right to future maintenance aml
. . . except as herein otherwise proyided. '' The
coulrl haYe reference only to the
whieh
provided.'' In my opinion the record
findings and the eonclusion of il1P
payments ·were modi:fiab!P.
affirm the judgment.

I

I

'HAUijjl\, ,J., Disscntiug>·IInshand m1d wi[;• are
fr<'P
competent persons to eoulract with Pa<:h othPr (Civ
~§ 158, 159.) 'l'here is no reason why tlwy cannot enter
into a property settlement agreement which includes a profor alimony, as such, which shall be snbjcct, within
limits, to control by the court. ]'or example, th(:
ies could agree to a maximum limit or to a minimum limit
or to both maximum and minimum limits, or they could inclndt' a cost-of-living sliding scale, the exact amount of conin each case to be fixed by the court if the parties
failed to agTee. 'l'hey could also provide for security to guaran1 maximum payments or they could agrer that the court
order complete termination of alimony upon the showing
of the occurrence of some casualty.
A eontract made by competent parties, and valid nnder
the
of contracts, does not for some mysterious reason 1wcome subject to alteration in or disregard of its tPrms
beennsr the contracting parties arc or WNe husband and ~wife.
Rui when the contract by its terms provides for thP payment
of
the ordinary meaning of the word snggests that
the amount of alimony shall remain snbject to control of
thP
unless that primar~· meaning is
or imited by the contract. Changing thP amonnt of alimoJJ;·
obviously is not ;m al1PratioJJ of the. eonirad wllPre
1he t•outract provides for "alimony" and does not
ihit
su1·h 1·hanges.
I cannot hold that as a matter of 1aw the eontraet
i~ noi snhject to the interpretat.ion giYen it hy the trial court.
'l'lw eontract was not in truth made a part of the~ <leet·er ol
divon~P. '!'he majority opinion ~tates that "'l'hr de<·n:e a pand incorporated by re{cnmce the provisiow:; of ilw
agreement and expressly ordered defendant to pay $500 per
month 'as agreed in ~aid property settlement agreement.'"
!Tt ies n<lded.) Bnt, as I l1an> hPrdofnre poinir;rl 0111
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),
the simple fact is that an
cannot be made a part
of a
unless it is in truth incorporated in the judgment so that when the judgment is copied in the judgment
book the whole of the judgment, necessarily including
is set forth word for word.
agreement which is a part of
effectual for any purpose until
' 'In no case is a
entered.' (Code Civ. Proc., §
To enter a judgment
means to copy it in the
book' so that it becomes a
and public record
Code
§ 668),
so that he who reads may know its content. Any portion of
a judgment not entered in the judgment book would be
ineffectual for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted
to enter any part of a judgment which had been filed, the
error of the ministerial officer could be corrected ; but if he
has performed his duty and the judgment as entered is truly
the judgment as rendered, and that judgment has become
final, then neither this court nor any other court or person
has power to add words to the language of that judgment."
(Flynn v. Flynn, supra.)
Inasmuch as the agreement was not incorporated in the
decree, the trial court's determination in the light of the
entire record that the order for payment of $500 monthly
was in the nature of an award of alimony, should be upheld.
I would affirm the judgment.

